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a
netpreneur online conversation
continuing
q&a for
a
question of scale: growing
(into) your customer base
On
July 24, 2002, Netpreneur’s Coffee & DoughNets event was
about “A
Question of Scale: Growing (Into) Your Customer Base.” Panelists included Patrick
Arnone, President of Arnone & Associates; Deepak
Hathiramani, President and CEO of Vistronix;
Cory
Marsan, Executive Vice President of Sales & Marketing
at ServiceBench; Rob
Masri, Vice President of Corporate Development at Multicity;
and moderator Eric
Becker, Managing Partner of Sterling
Venture Partners.
Following
the event, panelists answered additional questions in The
Loop, an email list where subscribers can continue the
conversations from Netpreneur events. That online conversation
is reproduced here. Some posts have been edited for length,
clarity, flow, and topicality. The complete, original posts
can be found in The
Loop archives, which is accessible to all subscribers.
Gene Gartner: There was much talk today about how the entrepreneur should
constantly evaluate the quality and capabilities of the
management team. This definitely should be done. However, are
there any suggestions for the members of the management team
regarding evaluating the ongoing management capabilities of
the entrepreneur or other founders?
Patrick
Arnone: Let me offer you these thoughts and suggestions:
1. If the entrepreneur/founder is the current CEO, then evaluation
of the ongoing management capabilities must come from the
Chairman and the Board Members. My view is that the
Chairman/Board Members must evaluate, assess, and determine if
the CEO is 1) focusing on and performing the proper roles and
responsibilities assigned, and, more importantly, 2) the CEO
is achieving or over achieving the key business and financial
metrics necessary to ensure the profitable growth of the
company. If the answer to #2 is no, a quick determination
needs to be made as to why not and, potentially, a change
should be made. Clearly, it is highly desirable for the
Chairman or a key board member to coach, mentor, and guide the
CEO, especially if they are a first time CEO and/or unproven
as a successful CEO in other business environments.
2. If the entrepreneur and/or other founders are not in the CEO
role, but, rather, in other functional positions within the
company (i.e. Sales, Marketing, Development, etc.) as the
senior executive for these functional areas, then the
evaluation of their ongoing management capabilities would be
made by the CEO, President, or COO to whom they report. With
the same points applying in #1 and #2 above relative to their
role, responsibilities, and, most importantly, their
tangible/measurable results and accomplishments.
3. When a hiring executive or CEO conducts a search for a new key
person or executive for their company, they must spend
sufficient time thinking through and documenting the salient
descriptions of this person’s roles and responsibilities;
their required experience, abilities, background, and
attributes; and the tangible results and accomplishments they
must produce. Generally, when a retained search is done, a
competent search consultant spends hours with the hiring
executive and/or CEO to define these key elements. There
generally are 12-15 for each category. Once recruited into the
company, this same criteria, descriptions, results, etc.
creates an excellent foundation for evaluating, managing, and
assessing the person within their role, their effectiveness,
success, and failure. Clearly the criteria would be adjusted,
modified, and updated as time goes forward.
Steve Goldenberg: One of the things that Eric Becker said today
really hit home with me: learning to say no to the wrong
customer. Like most rising companies, our current and
prospective customers sometimes end up being more trouble than
they're worth. What are the best techniques for saying no,
without burning a bridge?
Cory
Marsan:
Good question. I'm a firm believer that honesty is the best
policy. In most cases your (former) customer will respect you
for this as long as you have some valid business reasons. At
Net2000, we went though a painful migration when we moved from
resale to a facilities-based network approach. Because our
costs to the ILEC for resale were so high (and margins so low
or non existent) we had to tell our re-sale customers that we
could no longer support them in this manner as economics
required us to change our business model. Many converted to
our facilities-based approach while others did not. For the
most part though there were few bitter feelings.
Seth Grimes: Well, there's that old dating technique,
"It's not you, it's me." That is, tell the customer
whose business you don't want not that they don't fit your
needs but that you wouldn't be able to adequately provide the
products/services they need.
I've
actually experienced a variation on this problem, which is how
to convince sales/marketing co-workers that some of their
prospects aren't worth going after. You have to keep working
with these people every day so you have to prepared to back up
your claims with good, convincing analysis.
Gary Honig: One thing I'll add is the demoralizing effect a bad customer
can have on a company. The customer who knows that you are a
small startup and figures that they can whip you around for a
low price can be very demoralizing to your delivery staff. As
someone said yesterday, hiring people is expensive. A bad
customer can also drive up your turn-over rates.
Steve Goldenberg: An entrepreneur friend of mine once told me,
"I raised my prices a little bit every year, even if I
didn't need to". He did this to keep the shock of a price
increase low so that customers didn't complain too much. He
got them used to the idea that they would see a small price
change every year. Now, this friend was in the funeral home
business, so repeat customers were almost a certainty. What
are some effective ways to minimize the blow that a price
increase deals to a customer? Is raising prices every year a
good idea? Specifically, we aggregate paying customers through
a partner, which is much more price sensitive than the actual
paying end user. What might we do to cushion the shock when we
raise prices?
Matt
Haley: Thinking of raising prices in timely increments makes a huge
assumption: that you already have the product and service
properly packaged and close to right price. Congratulations if
you are already there! More commonly I see prices and packages
based on tradition, past experience, and little testing.
Price
changes are easiest when synchronized with value changes.
Those can be done in both directions, by adding perceived
value and removing perceived value. You may find a product
that you thought properly priced is actually in a much more
elastic market than you anticipated and a lower priced, lower
featured product or service level increases revenue and profit
simultaneously. Conversely, you may find what you thought to
be an elastic market is not, and marketing to the end user
while selling through an indirect channel supports a higher
price point with little more cost than listening "channel
whine." While painful and aggravating, it is little more
consequential than listening to a four-year-old whine.
Your
price received is the customer’s decision. Think through
varying the solution delivered, and what value is being
delivered. Think through if you can change the timing of
payment that may actually have a more advantageous impact on
your bottom line. In the funeral home market, pre-selling
funerals locked in a lower price, but got the payments done
months or years ahead of the costs incurred. You may not have
that option, but you may have other options. Pricing is simply
one component in the profit equation. Can you vary the
product/service mix? Can you introduce product line extensions
that offer premium value at a cost less than the incremental
price? Have you examined the end users alternatives to ensure
you are safe from flanking competition and then determined if
you can actually change the price with minimal impact beyond
whining?
I
once changed a product price point from $7K-10K to $175K, then
to $750K, then $1.5 million with minimal technical
enhancements. The biggest change was first internal: Who
should we be selling to? How does that market like to buy
things? What is the delivered value (the business case)? What
is the perceived value? How can I match the
marketing/channel/targeting to a better mix? What is the
proper product/service ratio? What is the true segmentation we
are selling to? Once you answer these questions, which are
rather difficult, you can then determine your packaging and
pricing. We had to dump our old markets, with the added cost
of supporting customers in a market we no longer wanted to
sell to. We had to build an internal sales force, create buzz
around the product, and sell to a different target title
within a customer than we had been selling to. The result was
rather astonishing, though. The company went from a value of
$10 million to 60 times that in two years. And the high
valuation was post market crash while the low valuation was
pre-crash.
Simply
put, you can't treat price as an independent variable any more
than you can treat product needs independently of the target
market. (Matt
Haley of Accenture has been a previous speaker at
Netpreneur's Coffee & DoughNets events including "Assessing
Your Value Proposition" and "Views
from the Valley."
Steve Deller: Cory's presentation today touched on compensation packages
for direct sales team members and referenced the need to
provide a package that is commission-based and offers proper
incentives for reaching specific goals. Our organization is an
Internet services company passing from a phase 1 state to a
phase 2, with reference clients and a strong delivery
infrastructure in place. We are faced with the task of
building a competent sales team of primarily journeymen,
"hunter-killers" to use one of today's terms.
However, we have not been able to find any good resources that
provide actual dollar amounts that have been adjusted to
today's market climate and the supply/demand of the local
resource pool. Some of the numbers we have seen from recent
years reference base salaries (for Web services) ranging from
$18-60K and commissions of 7-10% of the net sales, based on
experience levels. Are these reasonable figures in today's
market? Are there publicly available statistics that people
have seen that give an idea of what we should be offering for
this space?
Cory
Marsan:
The answer to your question depends on many things. First,
you need to look at it from a total package perspective; that
is, base plus compensation. What is the target income for your
candidate at 100% of quota. If your sales cycle is relatively
short (say two months or less), your base salaries are
typically lower with commission potential being a driver. The
reverse is true with longer, more complex sales.
You
can assess competitive compensation packages by interviewing
candidates from companies similar to your own. It won't take
long to get a pulse on industry standards. There are benchmark
studies available as well. You may want to check some of the
Web-based HR companies to see what statistics may be
available.
Jim
Stockmal:
From what I have seen advertised on
private subscription based executive search/position listings
such as Netshare,
6FigureJobs.com,
and others, some of the most senior Account Executives, Sales
Managers, etc., positions are advertised much higher than the
numbers referenced for base. Commissions are all over the map,
which, as Brad says, often includes extreme payout situations
for real stretch goals. However, several part time positions
that are almost all commission-based would draw a greater
percentage.
Shalom Flank: How do you structure compensation and commission for your
first dedicated direct sales people, especially for
cash-starved startups?
Patrick Arnone: A great question but a difficult one to answer
without knowing the answers to a number of questions. For
example, do you sell a product or service? Is the product a
point product, technical one, or an enterprise level product?
What is the level of complexity? What is the price point,
average sale/order price, and the best-case revenue in your
largest deals? Who is it sold to? Who makes the ultimate
buying decision? Who has the authority to sign the
contract/order—CIO, CEO, CFO, or a line business executive
outside the IT organization? In what vertical markets or
industries does the product have broad need and appeal? Is
this a missionary sale? How much market education must be
done? What is the realistic sales cycle to close? Can you
accept less than an "A” player? Less than a true
"hunter/killer" who will always overachieve their
assigned quota, blow away their numbers and always make far
more than the CEO in cash compensation? The same or similar
questions apply if you offer a service (as well as a number of
other questions that I won't go into).
I
will share with you my first-hand experience and knowledge
which is both good news and bad news.
The
bad news for a cash starved startup is that even in today's
poor market and employment conditions, a true world class A
player, hunter/killer type of salesperson with the caliber of
the best salespeople from, say, a Siebel or Oracle, enjoy a
total cash income target at 100% of revenue quota in the
$200K-$250K annually. This $200K-$250K range is generally
comprised of 50-60% base salary with the balance in
commissions. This type of salesperson is accustomed to earning
well in excess of $500k or more per year, with the
best-of-the-best in excess of $1 million a year, exclusive of
stock options. They tend to carry annual revenue quotas in the
$4 million to $10 million range, depending on a number of
factors. The commission rates accelerate and increase as the
salesperson achieves and always when they over-achieve 100% of
their assigned revenue quota. It is not uncommon to see
commission rates (when above 100% of quota) in the 5%, 10%,
and 15% level. This type of salesperson is generally not laid
off, not unemployed or sitting on a bench somewhere, but
happily engaged with their current company, making a lot of
money, hoping their options will be re-priced and/or someday
will not be under water. They tend to be equally motivated and
incented by cash compensation as well as stock options based
on their assessment of their company's prospects for success.
But they are usually receptive to hearing about the next hot
company they can join to achieve more of the same.
The
good news is that there are countless numbers of salespeople
on the street, laid off, fired, can't find a sales position,
etc. with more than 95% being B, C and D level players. Your
approach to structuring an effective compensation plan is only
limited by your imagination. A fact to consider is that when
Tom Siebel launched his company which he did without ever
raising any VC money, he compensated his initial salespeople
with 100% stock options, no cash compensation whatsoever.
Siebel hired the best and brightest from Oracle's A team and
several other high flying software companies, built a very
strong sales engine that still exists today, and didn't start
providing more generally practiced sales compensation models
until they were up and running, generating $25-$50 million in
revenue. This is possible today, but only for the next Siebel,
Oracle, SAP, etc. who need to attract the A player. Beyond
this approach, you could embrace a highly leveraged
compensation model where base salary represents 0-30% of total
cash compensation at 100% of quota with the balance in
commissions based on revenue achievement. I personally believe
this will attract only the C and D players, especially with
target cash compensation less than $130K per year. To attract
the B players you need to reach a minimum cash compensation
target at 100% of quota in the $150K-$170K range. You always
want to motivate, incent, and reward your sales people to
overachieve their revenue quota when they exceed 100%. This is
good for the company and the sales rep. Note that much of what
I shared doesn't apply if you are a company with a strict
services offering, especially operating with lower gross
profit margins.
Lastly,
stock options, while still of interest to the A and B
salesperson and of value as a recruiting tool in building a
strong sales team, don't demand the importance or leverage to
you today as they did over the last few decades. Good luck.
Seth
Grimes:
I'm actively looking for a
sales/marketing lead for my company -- we resell an analytical
software package and provide associated and non-associated
professional services -- so I've been struggling with these
same recruiting and compensation questions. I have a proposal
from a company that outsources recruiting and managing sales
staff, Sales Focus (I
have no other connection to them) and they provided the
following table of compensation figures, exclusive of
commission:
level
experience
base salary
entry
1-3 years
$35K-$50K
mid
2-5 years
$50K-$75K
high
5-10 years
$70K-$95K
rainmaker
10+ years
$95K-$120K
For my company, I'd expect 4-6 sales per year where software sales
would run about $100k so the commission could add
substantially to the base salary. I figure about 10%
commission for a sales person. (Sales Focus would charge me
15% with the difference being their "vigorish.")
Ben Martin: Here's an interesting article from Entrepreneur.com, The
Right Carrot, and a related book on the topic of
compensation and motivating salespeople: Compensating
New Sales Roles: How to Design Rewards That Work in Today's
Selling Environment by Jerome Colletti and Mary Fiss.
Larry Wolter: Where do you see business development influencing your sales
cycle? Should business development be centralized or
de-centralized within the service areas?
Deepak Hathiramani: At Vistronix, we view business development as a
critical function that is the responsibility of every team
member including a dedicated business development team. At
this stage of the company, we believe a centralized business
development team with a targeted agency focus is the right
answer. Every business development team member must possess
the ability to recognize an opportunity for any of the
operational groups/core service offerings. One of the reasons
we prefer a client focused centralized business development
function is the fact that it allows each business development
team member to develop and nurture the client relationship
within an account. One shortfall in this strategy is that the
decision maker/sponsor for each of our core
offerings/solutions may not be a single individual. In short,
there are positives and negatives to each approach and you
should select the structure that best fits your strategy.
Ben Martin: Eric Becker of Sterling Venture Partners made the point that
he and his partners use a "human capital assessment"
program both in due diligence as well as each year with all of
their portfolio companies to encourage them to recognize the
strengths and weaknesses of their teams and to do something
about it, often through training, skills development, hiring,
and lastly, making those difficult changes that we all tend to
avoid -- changing someone's' role within the company or
counseling them out of the company. He suggested the following
book as a helpful resource: Topgrading:
How Leading Companies Win by Hiring, Coaching and Keeping the
Best People by Bradford Smart.
Gene Gartner: I'll have to admit that I am not a fan of using assessments
during the hiring process. The companies that I have seen do
this tend to have a very homogenous personality. The
assessments tend to turn out cookie cutter people and it is
much easier to fall into “group think.” I liken it to the
companies that only recruit from certain schools. After
awhile, everyone looks the same. I like diversity in all
things. Having diverse personalities and ways of thinking
creates a greater possibility for finding the unusual solution
or next great idea. Homogeneity in anything just leads to
incrementalism.
Ron Peterson (of Three Arrows
Capital): I'm reminded of Daniel
Goleman's books on emotional intelligence and how study
after study shows no correlation between management success
and effectiveness with either academic achievement or with
standard intelligence measures. This is in contrast with a
tendency to populate executive ranks with people holding
impressive academic credentials, in Goleman's terms, usually
the worst pool that you could draw from! This phenomena
probably hails from our collective obsession with education as
well as a feeling that you've done your "due
diligence" if the guy eventually screws up. The academic
achievements form a protective barrier for the Board or
whoever makes the hiring decision. I certainly made that
mistake in the distant past, much to my discredit.
Anthony Strande: Mind citing the reference to the idea that more
education is worse? Does this mean that less education is
better? Or does the argument run something like average people
like to congregate with average people and the world is
composed of mostly average people?
Gene Gartner: I guess this hits on a couple of my hot buttons. Education
and intelligence are not detrimental to management success. I
think the problem comes from smart people who go through
education and believe that there is a management science.
There is science only in the fact that you need to be able to
understand the analysis of the business. Ultimately, every
company succeeds based on the management of the collective
talents of the company. Managing talent is not a science but a
feel.
One
of the funniest things I heard about managing came from Billy
Martin, the former manager of the NY Yankees. He said this
about managing a major league baseball team: "There's
gonna be probably 11 or 12 guys that really like you. There
are gonna be five or six that hate you. The key to being a
successful manager is keeping the other seven or eight guys
that haven't made up there minds away from the ones that hate
you."
I'm
not advocating that style of management but Martin did win a
lot with some very diverse personalities, including his own.
Brian Barrett: Right out of college I was given a personality
assessment test by a company I was interviewing with. I
was hired for the job but not given the results. A couple of
years later I had proved to be a good performer for the sales
team, and the then President called me into his office. He
thanked me for my superior sales performance and showed me the
results of the assessment I had taken before I was hired. The
assessment stated that I would not make a good salesperson
because I had too much empathy and that hiring me was not
recommended. I later became the President of the company.
In
1996 I interviewed with a company. Part of the process
included an assessment, a single sheet of paper with words in
two columns. I read the instructions. I did not understand
them. I asked my would-be boss for clarification and was again
told the instructions as they were on the sheet. I pointed out
the ambiguity of the instructions and was told to just do the
best I could. I was not asked for a second interview. I would
not have gone back either since I felt any company that placed
any value at all on a test that could have such ambiguous
results did not have the open-minded culture I was looking
for. My suspicions were later confirmed when a friend joined
the company and was fired months later on a bogus charge.
In
June of 2001, the national sales force of a telco of which I
was a part was given a one-on-one, four-hour test of their
individual abilities. I felt the assessment was very
professionally done and was confident that the results would
reflect accurately our abilities. The results were to be
tabulated and distributed in August 2001. Unfortunately, I had
made quota only once in 10 months and was let go at the end of
July. A friend and fellow salesman called me in mid-August and
told me that I was ranked highest in the national sales force
in ability. The company went bankrupt and closed days later.
The head of the testing firm later told me my results were at
the top 5% he had ever given and wanted to get me in with some
other international companies he was recruiting for.
To
sum up, my first experience with an assessment test was
interesting because the vary trait it claimed would be my
downfall is the trait I credit with my success. My second
experience was important because it made the organization that
required it look ludicrous and accurately displayed a cultural
shortcoming. My third experience, obviously with a head-strong
startup, was interesting because the company had spent many
thousands of dollars (probably over $100K) to assess the sales
force rather than spending the money making the corrections
that I and others recommended that would have positively
enhanced our customers experience, thus making them not only
more inclined to buy more themselves, it also would make them
referral sources for new business. Upper level management was
looking at sales as the problem when the product was the
problem.
Assessments
can be useful when applied correctly but I don't think they
can ever be the final word or viewed in a vacuum. Draw your
own conclusions.
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