0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 LIVING WITH VENTURE CAPITALISTS POST-INVESTMENT 11 12 Tuesday, October 19, 2004 13 14 Ritz Carlton 15 1700 Tysons Boulevard 16 McLean, Virginia 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0002 1 A T T E N D A N C E 2 3 VENTURE CAPITALIST PANEL 4 Mark Frantz, Carlyle Venture Partners 5 Harry Weller, New Enterprise Associates 6 Steve Fredrick, Novak Biddle Venture Partners 7 Scott Frederick, Valhalla Partners 8 9 FEATURED SPEAKERS: 10 Jeff Bede, Chessiecap 11 Chris Cantarella, Ernst & Young 12 Jeff Lehrer, Gray Cary 13 Larry Robertson, Netpreneur 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0003 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 [8:15 a.m.] 3 MR. LEHRER: Good morning. Welcome to the 4 third meeting of the Living with Venture Capitalists of 5 the Venture Capital Series, what entrepreneurs 6 absolutely need to know about raising venture capital. 7 We really thank you for joining us this morning. 8 The panel was actually started -- we had our 9 first panel almost one year ago to the date, October 10 23rd, when the sponsors, E&Y, Gray Cary, Netpreneur, 11 and we also had a sponsor, Chessie Capital, got 12 together and said, "What's missing from the community?" 13 And we thought a seminar where VCs give advice to 14 entrepreneurs as if they were their brothers or their 15 sisters, a really candid seminar on what is in the 16 minds of the VCs. And we thought how wonderful it 17 would be to be able to share with the community, in an 18 open-forum type setting, what the VCs are truly 19 thinking in order to help entrepreneurs raise venture 20 capital. So this is the third series in our panel, and 21 it's specifically focused on life after you do the 22 venture capital investment. 23 The first panel we did was Obtaining the 24 Necessary Investor Presentation Materials, and What 25 Life is Like at the Very First Meeting with the VC, the 0004 1 questions asked and some recommended answers. The 2 second panel, we did approximately six months ago was 3 on Due Diligence and Negotiating the Terms Sheet. And 4 this one, I think, is going to be the most interesting 5 of the three panels. Not only is it the least talked- 6 about subject, but I think it is the most relevant and 7 most important, what life is like and how to maximize 8 the success of your company, and using the VCs to help 9 with that success. 10 So it's my pleasure to introduce the speakers 11 for today. My name is Jeff Lehrer, and I'm the head of 12 venture capital for Gray Cary. Some of you may know, 13 as of yesterday Gray Cary merged with the law firm of 14 Piper Rudnick, and we're now going to be Piper Rudnick 15 Gray Cary. We have 400- -- now we have 430 lawyers in 16 the Mid-Atlantic region providing the most dominant law 17 firm in the Mid-Atlantic that this market has ever 18 seen, and we hope to be able to provide even better 19 service for everybody. 20 Our next speaker is going to be my good 21 friend Larry, from Netpreneur, who is also the 22 president of Lighthouse Consulting, which is an 23 excellent, excellent company that provides consulting 24 to young companies about raising venture capital and on 25 operating plans, and he's going to be talking in more 0005 1 detail to recap the previous seminars to put everything 2 together. 3 And then we're going to have our esteemed 4 panel. We have Harry Weller, a partner from NEA. We 5 have Mark Frantz, partner from Carlyle. We've got 6 Scott Frederick, partner from Valhalla. And last, but 7 not least, is Steve Fredrick, partner at Novak Biddle. 8 And then at the end there's going to be a 9 very short, concise summary from Jeff Bede, of Chessie 10 Capital, who's going to give you his impressions to 11 walk away, and the things to really focus on when you 12 leave. 13 So please join me in giving one round of 14 applause to our panelists for coming this morning. 15 [Applause.] 16 MR. ROBERTSON: Good morning, and welcome to 17 session three of our three-part series on Venture 18 Capital. 19 I want to also note that moderating the panel 20 today is Chris Cantarella, from Ernst & Young, and he 21 has done a fabulous job the last two sessions, and I'm 22 sure this session will be no exception. 23 I'm Larry Robertson, as Jeff said, and my job 24 in the next few minutes is the following: first, to 25 provide you with some context for this session, Living 0006 1 with the Venture Capitalist Post-Investment, as it 2 relates to the previous two sessions; and, secondly, to 3 lay out some of the basic points, the need-to-knows of 4 this particular session, really, to establish a 5 foundation right up front so that our panelists can 6 focus on the finer points of how it all comes together 7 in the day-to-day world of venture capital or venture 8 capitalist/entrepreneur relationship. 9 Now, this three-part series on Venture 10 Capital was really designed to be a continuous 11 education or discussion, so even though each of the 12 three sessions stand alone, the sessions are really 13 also meant to hang together to give you a more complete 14 perspective on what venture capital is, why and when it 15 can be important to your business, how to most 16 successfully go about securing it and what to expect, 17 and what to do after you've secured an investment in 18 order to maximize the venture-capital relationship. 19 Now, I want to say that last part again. The 20 point of this series, and the point of raising venture 21 capital, is to maximize more than just the capital; 22 it's to maximize the venture-capital relationship, and 23 hopefully that will become clearly evident this 24 morning. 25 So the first thing I want to do, which Jeff 0007 1 touched on briefly, is, I want to talk to you about 2 what we tried to do in laying out this series, as Jeff 3 said, almost -- starting a year ago. What we wanted to 4 do is take you down the venture-capital path from the 5 uncommon perspective, but the one that we think is more 6 important. This is typically where the venture-capital 7 discussion focuses, somewhere between going out and 8 trying to attract investors to your investment 9 opportunity, and getting a terms sheet. This is not 10 the complete venture-capital process, and so our goal 11 was, one, to make it more complete, but, two, to take 12 three stops along the way that are often overlooked 13 even in casual discussion, not only in formal 14 presentations. 15 And so the first place we started in our 16 first session last fall was really the process before 17 the process. This was the idea of backing up the bus 18 on the venture-capital decision and really talking 19 about what you are getting into and whether or not you 20 should. 21 In our second session, we built on that, and 22 we assumed that at that point you had taken stock of 23 yourself and your business as an entrepreneur and you 24 knew what you needed and where you were. In fact, we 25 assumed that at that point you had also taken stock of 0008 1 the many different options for outside capital out 2 there, in addition to venture capital, and you decided 3 that venture capital was the most appropriate fit for 4 your business. It was a very important stopping point 5 in this discussion. In doing so, we also assumed that 6 you understood how the venture-capital business 7 operated, what the pluses and minuses were, that you 8 were ready to assume those. And so the focus of 9 session two was really talking about, once you'd made 10 that choice, How do you get from that first deal to a 11 close -- not just a terms sheet, but to a close? 12 So in this final session, what we're doing 13 is, we're, again, carrying you beyond the typical 14 boundaries of the discussion on venture capital, and 15 we're talking about what life is like after you've 16 received that investment and you now have the venture 17 capitalist in your business as a partner. So it's a 18 more complete process. We think it is a more unique 19 way of looking at things. 20 But why should you care? I'm sure that each 21 of you have your own reasons for being here this 22 morning. Maybe it's to come and learn about this 23 content of this particular session or to complete the 24 education from the three sessions. Maybe you came here 25 to network, or maybe you hope to meet one or more of 0009 1 these five gentlemen here this morning and talk to them 2 about your investment opportunity. But there are 3 bigger and better reasons for why you should be here 4 and for why we did this series, and I would like to 5 discuss a few of them, just briefly. 6 These are some of the benefits we hope you 7 gain from this session and from all three, and things 8 we tried to focus on as we created this series. The 9 first is, we wanted to help make you a better-educated 10 consumer. The more you know about venture capital, the 11 more you understand the process you're getting into and 12 whether or not it's right for you or wrong for you, 13 and, if you do decide it's right for you, how to best 14 secure it, the better and more effective you're going 15 to be in securing it. By the same token, we wanted to 16 make you -- you have multiple roles as an entrepreneur 17 -- an educated seller, because ultimately in a venture- 18 capital transaction, it's the sale of a product; you're 19 selling the opportunity to invest in your business. So 20 the more you understand about your consumer -- the 21 venture capitalist, how they look at things, what they 22 want to learn, how they operate -- the more likely you 23 are to be effective in securing venture capital. And 24 so really we're hoping, in that sense, to make the 25 venture capitalist an educated consumer, as well, 0010 1 because the more you understand them, the faster you 2 can help them to understand you, the better the 3 investment. The two, combined, hopefully make for a 4 more efficient market, and really that's a benefit to 5 everybody in this room. 6 None of us has time to waste. The more that 7 you know about them as investors, the faster they can 8 get to the data points about you, the more you're 9 working off the same page, the higher the percentage of 10 deals that get done. The better the deals, the happier 11 the players in this equation. And what we're really 12 talking about is a higher odds of success in you 13 securing funding and in you being able to take your 14 business forward to the next level. 15 We've all heard the old cliche that that nine 16 out of ten businesses fail, and the odds are even worse 17 for most companies that try to raise venture capital; 18 most don't secure it. And there are lots of reasons, 19 but one of the main ones is a lack of understanding of 20 the process, and that was one of our main goals in 21 putting this series together, was to help you better 22 understand the process. 23 So, let's talk very briefly about some of the 24 lessons from session one and two. There were lots of 25 good lessons, lots of good things to take away from the 0011 1 first two sessions. I want to focus on just a handful 2 that I think are most relevant to the discussion today 3 so we have that as a backdrop. 4 First point, as I said earlier: There's more 5 than one source of capital out there available to you. 6 Pick the one that best fits your profile and your 7 needs. In our first session, and, I think, again in 8 our second session, we talked about the different 9 sources of capital. And, by the way, transcripts are 10 available for these events on the Netpreneur Web site 11 if you weren't able to attend the first two sessions. 12 But what we talked about is that it's important to 13 understand where you are with your business, what the 14 different sources of capital are that are available to 15 you, what their profile is like, and to make an 16 appropriate match before you decide to take one capital 17 path or another. 18 Secondly, anytime you take outside capital, 19 it's about compromise. Anytime you go outside the 20 comforts of your own shop and ask somebody else to help 21 you propel your business forward, especially if that 22 somebody else is providing you with capital and has 23 extraordinary return expectations, it's about 24 compromise, and so you need to be prepared, and you 25 need to understand where that compromise comes in, 0012 1 where it's appropriate, so that realizing that does not 2 become a stumbling block along the way when you're 3 already in the process of raising capital. 4 Third, believe it or not, venture capitalists 5 have a job; and, believe it or not, most entrepreneurs 6 don't take the time to figure out what their job is. 7 Their job is to provide an extraordinary return on 8 somebody else's money. Just as you would make a sale 9 to any other customer, it's very important to 10 understand the perspective of this customer, and it's 11 very important to understand what they're ultimately 12 trying to accomplish so that you can tailor the 13 information that you give them to what they're 14 interested in, to what they're trying to understand, so 15 that they can determine whether or not they want to 16 make an investment in you. 17 Fourth, there's really only one reason why 18 entrepreneurs and venture capitalists get together, and 19 that's around the activities of selling a product. And 20 the product, as I said before, is the opportunity to 21 invest in your business. 22 Number five, there really is a process behind 23 raising venture capital, and it's on both sides -- 24 yours as the entrepreneur, and theirs as the investor. 25 There really is a somewhat systematic way that venture 0013 1 capitalists get from determining what kind of companies 2 they want to invest in, to identifying and sifting 3 through those companies, and then deciding which ones 4 they're actually going to make an investment in. And 5 on your side, there's a real logical path, as an 6 entrepreneur, that you travel, between determining when 7 you need outside capital, what's the right profile or 8 source of capital for you, and then most effectively 9 making that sale to that targeted customer. 10 And, finally, the deal does not end with the 11 terms sheet. This is something we focused on in the 12 last session. It's really, when you get the terms 13 sheet, that is where it begins, that is where you're 14 really starting to sort out the finer points of what a 15 partnership with a venture capitalist would look like 16 and whether or not you can actually consummate one. 17 So those are some of the points from the last 18 session. 19 I just want to take a few minutes to build 20 the foundation for this session by highlighting a few 21 important points. 22 And the first and most important one is, you 23 have to remember that, after the deal is done, it's 24 very important, as an entrepreneur, to shift your 25 perspective on both the venture capitalist and your 0014 1 relationship with them. You're really moving from a 2 sale to a partnership. 3 Clearly, when you begin your relationship 4 with a venture capitalist, they are your customer or 5 your prospective customer, and the focus is on the 6 sale, the sale of the opportunity to invest in your 7 business. But this is unlike any other customer/seller 8 relationship, because once they buy, they become an 9 owner in your business. Selling them the product is no 10 longer the priority. Working with them to reach the 11 goals for the company and the company's use of capital 12 is. It is a partnership, and there are many shared 13 goals an interests, believe it or not. 14 But of course, like any relationship, there 15 are going to be differences of opinion along the way, 16 and the best way to start the partnership and the best 17 way to manage the differences over time is to properly 18 set expectations. 19 Now, this is something that, as an 20 entrepreneur, you should be doing when you're actually 21 selling them the opportunity to invest in your 22 business. And if you overestimate the expectations, 23 either during that sales process or after, you're 24 likely to pay for it in the quality of the 25 relationship. So keep in mind that as we move into 0015 1 this period in our discussion of Living with the 2 Venture Capitalist, you're moving from a sale to a 3 partnership with a venture capitalist. 4 Okay, "partnership" is a pretty powerful 5 word, and it should say more to you than just a source 6 of money in the case of your venture-capital partner. 7 In fact, your perspective all along the way in 8 identifying a venture -- a prospective venture-capital 9 partner, in seeking that investment, should have been 10 what they could provide to you in addition to capital. 11 Well, now, once the sale is done, it's time 12 to shift to that mindset. So now you've got the money, 13 now you have to engage the partner in your business, 14 and you have to do that by more than simply reviewing 15 numbers at a quarterly board meeting. The investor has 16 to understand the path that you're on, where it is you 17 want to go, and where you are at any point in time if 18 they're going to be able to help you and be effective 19 as a partner in your business. The investor also needs 20 to know where you have needs and how those needs impact 21 your shared goals; in particular, return. 22 And once the path is clear, investors need to 23 be engaged in very specific ways to help you. You need 24 to give them assignments, timetables, deliverables, of 25 course, that are appropriate to the relationship. But, 0016 1 like any other member of your team or any other 2 contributor to the bottom line, if you don't engage 3 them and you don't tell them what to do, it's very 4 difficult for them to help you. And it's important to 5 think of them in this way because they are, quite 6 literally, part of your team at this point. 7 I think it's also important to point out that 8 this is a relationship that has no predestined outcome. 9 It's your job as the entrepreneur, and yours alone, to 10 manage it, to be a good relationship or a bad one. The 11 venture capitalist is like many other players on your 12 team, but, in the end, as the entrepreneur it is your 13 team, and so your job is to manage the players on that 14 team. Many venture capitalists are very proactive and 15 they're very good at what they do, and they can 16 contribute a lot of value to your company. However, 17 your job is to determine the best way for them to 18 engage and then work with them to make sure that they 19 contribute that value in the way that is going to allow 20 your team, your company, to meet its goals. 21 And related to this theme of players on a 22 team, let's get one thing straight, up front. Venture 23 capitalists do not want to run your business. This is 24 often a huge preoccupation for entrepreneurs around the 25 close of the deal and immediately after and, for some, 0017 1 for a long time thereafter, but it can dramatically 2 shade your relationship if you can't get beyond this 3 perception. 4 Let's go back to the point -- the earlier 5 point. It is your team, and it is your business. It 6 was before the investment; it is after the investment, 7 regardless of ownership percentages. Your job is not 8 to worry about somebody else taking over that team; 9 your job is to worry about what's important. And 10 what's important is performance. Performance is what 11 you were achieving before you sought money. 12 Performance is the reason that you sought venture 13 capital in the first place, to continue and to expand 14 on your ability to perform. Performance is why the 15 venture capitalist invested in you. So focus on what's 16 important. 17 There's no question that venture capitalists 18 have strong opinions and they will share them with you. 19 As co-owners in your business, you really shouldn't 20 expect anything less. And because you're often talking 21 with them about your business, primarily talking with 22 them about your business and your performance, it can 23 feel very personal. However, they invested in you, in 24 your ability to run the company and in your ability to 25 use their capital to grow the company. In addition to 0018 1 that, don't forget, they already have a job. Their job 2 is to invest in businesses like yours, not to take over 3 the operations of them. 4 The fifth point that I want to make is that 5 this is a relationship that will evolve over time. 6 What it looks like today is not necessarily what it 7 will look like next quarter or three years from now. 8 You have to expect it to evolve, and you have to allow 9 it to evolve. And if you think about your business 10 itself, if you think about it when you first started 11 out, if you think about it right before you decided to 12 raise money, if you think about what you want it to 13 look like after you raised the money -- it's in 14 constant change, constant flux. So the goals for the 15 business will change. Opportunities will come up or 16 disappear. And your decisions about whether or not to 17 go forward with them will change. You can't expect 18 that you'll always be on the same page with your 19 partners or that you'll always see things the same way. 20 At some point in time, your views will differ. 21 However, the key is to be aware of change, to 22 anticipate it and to manage the relationships that will 23 be impacted by it, and this includes your relationship 24 with investors. 25 The best way to weather change in your 0019 1 business and any change it brings to your investor 2 relationships is to communicate. It's that simple. Do 3 it early, do it often, and do it truthfully. Your new 4 policy really should be "ask and tell." If you don't 5 ask them for help, if you don't tell them where you are 6 and where you have needs, then you're very likely to 7 throw the relationship off track. It's really pretty 8 simple. If you don't ask, how can they help? If you 9 surprise your partner by not communicating with them -- 10 just don't surprise your partner; it never has a good 11 outcome. It always has a long-lasting effect. And if 12 you don't tell them where you're headed, ask for help 13 when you need it, tell them where they fit, and then 14 engage them to do it, you really can't expect the 15 outcome of your relationship with them, or where you 16 want to go with their money, to be a very positive one. 17 Perhaps most importantly, don't forget to 18 listen to them. Good venture capitalists have been 19 through many growth cycles with many companies. They 20 know a lot of things that can help your business. No, 21 they don't know everything. Sorry. But, yes, their 22 opinions are very important, even if they may differ 23 from yours, and they deserve to be part of the equation 24 when you're making decisions about your business. 25 And, finally, you may have differences in the 0020 1 goals that you have for your business versus the goals 2 that your investment partner has for your business over 3 time, but there's one goal that never changes. It's 4 always shared. And that is the goal of return. This 5 one needs no window dressing. Performance is why you 6 sought capital. Your ability to perform is why the 7 venture capitalist provided you with capital. Using 8 that capital to achieve return is a shared goal. That 9 is what makes a business a business. Don't lose sight 10 of that. 11 Chris Cantarella, your moderator, and I were 12 talking the other day, and, as we've been reviewing the 13 themes for the last two sessions, or the ones that I 14 just laid out as a basis for this session, it seems 15 that there's some commonality that runs underneath 16 them. And if I was to oversimplify all the many 17 lessons you could take away from these sessions we've 18 had, including this morning's, and to try to draw a 19 lesson about how you could successfully consider the 20 decision to pursue venture capital effectively and 21 efficiently, secure it, and then leverage the capital 22 and the relationship to maximize value, I'd tell you 23 that it boils down to two things: discipline and 24 perspective. And this is a constant balancing act. It 25 is what we've tried to do in this series and what we've 0021 1 tried to convey to you. It is what you have to do in 2 your business every day. 3 So these are the topics that the panel is 4 going to focus on this morning. And right now I would 5 like to introduce Chris Cantarella, your moderator, and 6 your panel. 7 [Applause.] 8 MR. CANTARELLA: Good morning, everybody. 9 Thank you. I really appreciate that summary. 10 Again, I think we're very fortunate to have four of the 11 top real young guns, strong VCs that we have in the 12 community. I personally feel privileged to be here 13 again with you guys, and look forward to this. 14 Now, what I would like to do is, we're going 15 to introduce ourselves real quick. Let me give you 20 16 seconds each, as -- to just introduce yourselves and 17 your firms you're in. But I want to poll the audience 18 real quick, I think it's always smart to know who 19 you're talking to and what the knowledge base is. 20 Let me start out with a question, just 21 basically, how many folks here have gone out to raise 22 capital before? 23 [A show of hands.] 24 MR. CANTARELLA: All right, great. Thank 25 you. How many of you are going to raise capital in the 0022 1 future? 2 [A show of hands.] 3 MR. CANTARELLA: Okay. How many of you have 4 been successful at raising some type of investment 5 capital? 6 [A show of hands.] 7 MR. CANTARELLA: And how many of you have 8 succeeded at obtaining venture capital? 9 [A show of hands.] 10 MR. CANTARELLA: All right, great. That's a 11 great start. 12 Well, with that, again, I'm Chris Cantarella. 13 I'm with Ernst & Young. I'm a business-development 14 type of guy, I lead business development for our 15 private equity practice, formerly our venture-capital 16 advisor group, as well, and here based in McLean. 17 Mark, why don't we start with you? 18 MR. FRANTZ: Mark Frantz, Carlyle Venture 19 Partners. We're a $600 million fund here in the U.S., 20 part of Clark Carlyle Group; it's a large private 21 equity firm. We also have funds in Europe and Asia in 22 venture, and obviously the firm works in the buyout and 23 real-estate asset classes, as well. Our firm, out of 24 the venture-capital side, invests in everything but 25 life sciences companies, so we'll do healthcare 0023 1 devices, IT, security software, enterprise software, 2 communications equipment, communications services, and 3 the like. We have done deals as early as three guys 4 and not so much a napkin, but not much beyond that, as 5 well as doing buyouts of small divisions of large 6 public companies. So we pretty much run the gamut. 7 MR. FREDRICK: I'm Steve Fredrick, a partner 8 with Novak Biddle Venture Partners based in Bethesda, 9 Maryland. We're an IT-only-focus, early-stage 10 investor, investing primarily on the East Coast, 350 11 million currently under management funds. We invest in 12 everything from three guys in a garage to companies 13 doing 50 million in revenue, but we haven't raised 14 outside capital before. 15 MR. WELLER: I'm Harry Weller, a partner at 16 NEA. We're a very large, early-stage venture-capital 17 firm, although we do do some later-stage 18 transformational capital, which means we invest in 19 stuff that either spin out or are fairly mature but 20 still require capital to grow pretty efficiently. 21 Probably the difference between us and a couple of the 22 guys is just simply that we're bi-coastal, both on the 23 West Coast and the East Coast. We've got a -- pretty 24 much a national footprint. And our current fund, about 25 a billion and -- 1.2 billion, and we also do tech, 0024 1 healthcare, med, life sciences. We really run the 2 gamut. 3 MR. FREDERICK: I'm Scott Frederick, a 4 partner with Valhalla Partners. We're about a $178 5 million fund. We focus on early-stage IT-centric 6 investments pretty much up and down the East Coast, but 7 we have a strong preference for deals that are closer 8 to home. Estimated probably, I would say, about 50-60 9 percent of our deals will be within an hour's drive. 10 MR. CANTARELLA: Great, guys. Well, I should 11 correct myself, too, I said "young guns." The truth 12 is, I have so much receding hairline, I think of a lot 13 of people as young these days. But these are partners 14 at these enormously strong firms, and I think we really 15 ought to listen to them today. 16 And right into it, our first event, we talked 17 about, gee, how do we approach VC? What perspective 18 should an entrepreneur have? Who should we go to 19 target? How should we go about the discipline of doing 20 that? And what perspective should we wear as we go 21 into that first meeting? 22 Then our second series, we put our second 23 panel on the series, we talked about how to try to get 24 the momentum and keep it, and it really reminds me of 25 the dating process. I'm sure you've all heard this 0025 1 analogy before. There's nothing new to this. But, as 2 we all know, dating is, kind of, the -- it can be 3 called the "fun time" -- it can be very challenging, 4 but it can be called the "fun period." You know? You 5 have a lot of freedom. And as you start to move 6 towards a lasting relationship, there can be some 7 apprehension. You know, you can be asking yourself, 8 "Gee, what's it going to be like to live with this 9 person?" I'm sure my wife was very scared going into 10 our marriage, knowing me. 11 [Laughter.] 12 MR. CANTARELLA: So that's something that 13 really starts to happen. You've got this momentum. 14 You've hopefully got some chemistry with the VC at some 15 point, and now you're starting down this road where the 16 transaction is going to be completed. You're going to 17 have this investor, hopefully, for a decently long 18 time, a couple of years, and you're going to have some 19 kind of relationship, and everybody has apprehensions 20 going into the long-term relationship. 21 And I think it would be really key to ask all 22 of you here, just as an open question -- I'm going to 23 ask some assigned questions here, too, but as an open 24 question, What is it like when you're first walking 25 into that first board meeting with the company? Now 0026 1 that the deal has been done, now that you're married, 2 what are you thinking, what are your fears, your 3 expectations, any apprehension, how does it feel 4 walking into that room? 5 MR. FREDERICK: I would start just by saying, 6 if there's too much apprehension, you shouldn't be 7 doing the deal in the first place. I guess my thought 8 is that if the due-diligence process is done correctly, 9 both parties should really have a pretty good sense of 10 what the relationship is going to be like in advance. 11 And I really do mean both parties. And I mean that in 12 the sense that both parties should have a sense of 13 their relationship, but both parties should also be 14 involved in the due diligence. I think that's a common 15 mistake, is that entrepreneurs forget to do due 16 diligence on the VCs themselves. Ask for references 17 and take them up on it, make calls, go one step further 18 and take our prior CEOs out to dinner and ask them what 19 we're like. I mean, the diligence really has to go 20 both ways. And if that process is done thoroughly, you 21 can -- both sides should have a really good sense of 22 what it's going to be like. Because, as Chris said, 23 this is a long-term relationship. It is five to seven 24 years in this environment. 25 MR. FRANTZ: I think Scott is right on, it is 0027 1 a two-way street. I think sometimes it varies by stage 2 of investment, sometimes it also, at least by my 3 experience, is whether the company is local or it's 4 somewhere you've got to travel on a plane. So, for 5 instance, if it's local and it's very early stage, 6 you've probably talked every day since the money was 7 wired, before that first board meeting, so there's a 8 real common knowledge base, there has already been 9 actions undertaken. If you have to get on a plane and 10 go somewhere and there are already four other investors 11 at the table, and you're the person who came in to do 12 the top-off round or the recap, or whatever, there can 13 be a little bit of apprehension -- or at least I've 14 experienced it -- where either sitting in the room or 15 having to walk into the room, it's like, "Wow, we saw 16 the terms sheets, we talked to you at one point on the 17 phone, but we've never done a deal with you before." 18 And it's just kind of like you're just wanting to make 19 sure that you just show up in front of your partnership 20 and really lobby hard to make this investment and 21 everything's on track the way you made it sound. As 22 Scott said, you have to do everything you can during 23 the diligence process to ensure that's the case, but 24 sometimes, especially with some later-stage deals, that 25 is difficult to do. 0028 1 I would also just add on Scott's point, do 2 not be afraid to "diligence" us. In fact, I encourage 3 you to do that, because why have one of us, or any of 4 our peers, sit on your board if, at the end of the day, 5 after talking to some people, you find out we're ogres 6 or we have a different philosophy than you do? We're 7 going to be owning a substantial part of your business. 8 There is taking it too far, we all agree -- 9 to be very candid up here this morning, and so I have a 10 good story -- we had one CEO who kept pressing us for 11 somebody with a lot more operating experience, because 12 this other venture firm had a significant operator they 13 were going to put on, and so, as we were going back and 14 forth trying to win this deal, we ended up with Dan 15 Ackerson, who is the senior advisor at our firm, spends 16 most of his time in the buyout shop, say, "Hey, look, 17 I'd be willing to do this. I think this is a great 18 company." Now, I don't know how many of you know Dan, 19 but he was the CEO of Nextel, he was the CEO or the CFO 20 of MCI, and he was the CEO of XO. And this particular 21 CEO asked Dan to come up and have lunch with him, and 22 then wanted to call all of his references, including 23 the CEO of American Express, where he sits on the 24 board, the CEO of Tyco, who is a friend of his from 25 business school. 0029 1 So there is doing appropriate diligence, and 2 then there is, "Careful what you ask for; you may get 3 it." 4 MR. FREDRICK: But I think, to Mark's point, 5 it really is important to do that due diligence, both 6 on the firm and the individual from the firm that's 7 going to be working with your company. And if you turn 8 up red flags, you need to track down those red flags; 9 because, unlike a marriage, I mean, I would argue that 10 a divorce in this business is almost impossible. I 11 mean, you're stuck. And, ideally, that's a good thing. 12 I mean, you can leave, but that is not what any 13 entrepreneur ever, I don't think, aspires to do. 14 You know, one thing I will add, that often, 15 in that first board meeting, I think, investors are 16 walking into that meeting and they're thinking to 17 themselves, "Okay, I'm going to find out how 18 transparent and forthright this team was during the 19 dating process, and I'm either going to be ecstatic 20 that they're ahead of plan and that they properly set 21 expectations or I'm going to feel a little bit like 22 they sold me a bill of goods. I'm going to start 23 questioning, maybe unfortunately, the integrity of the 24 team. Was it just a modest stretch? Was it a real big 25 stretch?" And to the points that were made earlier, I 0030 1 think that can really get things off on the wrong 2 footing. 3 I will say that the greatest experiences are 4 going into those first board meetings. I remember 5 going into the first Blackboard board meeting, and they 6 had knocked their plan off the charts in that first 7 month, and everybody looked at it. The fellow with us 8 looks around the table and said, "This is likely to be 9 a good deal," and it turned out to be a good deal. So 10 I think it is important to be transparent during the 11 process. 12 MR. WELLER: I guess I'll be last. I have a 13 little different take on it, just because I think it's 14 interesting -- I'm sure a lot of you have played with 15 recipes and thrown spices in. You can know everything 16 about each individual spice, but when you throw it into 17 a broth, you have, sometimes, no idea what you're going 18 to get. And what I mean by that is, I'm actually -- if 19 we did our due diligence right, we generally know what 20 we're into, as Scott pointed out. But what you don't 21 know is how the board is going to work together. And 22 what I'm nervous when I enter into a board meeting for 23 the first time, is, "Boy, how is this board team going 24 to work together? What's going to be the emerging 25 character of that board, and is it going to be able to 0031 1 work well together or not?" And that's what I'm 2 nervous about, is, you just never know about how the 3 individuals are going to work. 4 The other big concern I generally have is -- 5 to be honest, is, Is it going to be -- I have two names 6 for this -- Is it going to be a war-room board or is it 7 going to be theater? And oftentimes you'll get into a 8 board-meeting situation where you almost get -- you 9 become audience, as opposed to working together on 10 common issues. And a lot of that comes from how it's 11 run on the part of the CEO. As much as you know a CEO, 12 as much as the due diligence you do, a board meeting 13 sometimes turns into this event, and you get a state- 14 of-the-union, as opposed to a discussion. 15 And so, for me, there's a lot around board 16 dynamics, a lot of the emerging phenomena, that are, 17 quite frankly, sometimes unpredictable. And so that is 18 what I worry about, is how that evolves over time. 19 MR. CANTARELLA: Those are great answers. 20 Boy, I don't know about you guys, but it's scary to 21 think -- but I think I see the next reality TV show 22 coming on with somebody coming up with what the 23 boardroom's like and the VC relationship, "The New 24 Apprentice." Certainly, a lot of drama can exude out 25 of those, I'm sure. And I can see the gleam in your 0032 1 eyes as you contemplate this. 2 The other thing is that, when we talk about 3 perspective, we always want the entrepreneurs to 4 understand how they should view the relationship. One 5 of the things I love to ask here, for the audience's 6 sake, is, What do you expect -- Mark, maybe you could 7 help us with that -- What do you expect of yourself in 8 this relationship? And, to that end, how do you see 9 yourself working with the company over time? How do 10 you envision your role? How do you envision the 11 chemistry, over time, with the company? 12 MR. FRANTZ: Thank God none of my CEOs are in 13 the room for this answer. 14 [Laughter.] 15 MR. FRANTZ: You know, I think its gets into 16 what I would like to think I am providing, and then, 17 quite candidly, to Scott's earlier point, you should 18 call -- I would like to think, going into it, my 19 perspective is, I'm here to be a value-added member of 20 the team. I thought Larry's line hit it right on, I'm 21 not here to run your company; I'm here to be your 22 partner. I'm here to do everything I can to help you, 23 out of my own network, out of my firm's network. I'm 24 here to go sit down, have a cup of coffee and talk 25 strategy at any time. I'm here to take the phone call 0033 1 at 11:00 o'clock at night about why you're going to 2 have to separate from the co-founder of the firm 3 because you guys have come to a fundamental 4 disagreement, et cetera. You're there to be that 5 advisor. And it's going to vary by day, by week, by 6 month, by stage of the company, if that's hands-on or 7 not. 8 What I'm also there to do is be committed. 9 One of the things that I think many entrepreneurs don't 10 fully appreciate is that we don't just take the state 11 of Texas or the state of Michigan or the Boeing pension 12 fund, as Larry said; we're responsible for other 13 people's money, but we're also responsible for our 14 money. I know every partner-up-here's firm has the 15 standard practice of, you invest alongside of your 16 deals. I literally had a conversation with one my CEOs 17 recently about -- well, I've got so much invested in 18 this deal, I'm, like, "Yeah, so do I" -- my wife calls 19 it "The Carlyle Tax." I've been writing more checks 20 from my firm than I've been taking back lately, and so 21 my money is in this game, too. 22 So, you know, my perspective is to be a 23 value-added team -- member of the team, to give advice 24 and counsel where needed on it -- and sometimes not 25 solicited -- but also to remain committed, to be there 0034 1 and not walk away from the situation. And again, 2 personally, I like my money, so I'm going to be 3 committed. 4 MR. CANTARELLA: Any other thoughts? 5 MR. FREDRICK: I will just add, I think one 6 of the real value-adds a venture investor or a board 7 member can provide is the pattern-recognition 8 capability, the experience of having worked in a lot of 9 different environments with a lot of different 10 companies and identifying potential problems early in 11 that percolation process. I think pattern recognition 12 is something you ought to expect, as well, from your 13 investors. 14 MR. CANTARELLA: Steve, real quick, just to 15 go into it a little bit, when you say "pattern 16 recognition," describe that just a little bit and 17 explain the value. I think I know what you're talking 18 about. I think we have some assumptions about what you 19 mean, but if you could just mention that real quick, 20 that might be a value-added, in and of itself, for the 21 board chemistry that Harry mentioned. 22 MR. FREDRICK: Well, Harry's point was spot- 23 on. I think a board -- that's one aspect of pattern 24 recognition, Is the board evolving in a constructive 25 manner to where it's effective? Are we attacking the 0035 1 strategy here for the company in a way that makes 2 sense? Where my firm may have done five deals in a 3 space and may have some perspective to add to the mix 4 that says, "This has often worked. We've seen this 5 approach taken four times, and it's never worked. So 6 for what that's worth, just add that to the mix." 7 But I think the ability to watch four or five 8 or twenty football games at once, and to have that 9 aggregate macro perspective, is something that venture 10 investors can provide, that when they're running a 11 company, and your head's down, and you're focused, 12 sometimes you don't have the luxury of coming up and 13 looking at it from 30,000 feet. 14 MR. CANTARELLA: That's great. 15 MR. FREDERICK: I think what pattern 16 recognition does for you is, it helps you with 17 anticipation, and that helps you with application of 18 best practices so you can see around the corner a 19 little bit. I mean, in our shop, across our GPs and 20 partners, we've been involved with over a hundred 21 companies, and I would say we're private. That 22 number's going to be smaller on this end than any of 23 the other three panelists. But you think about all the 24 experiences and the learnings that go on across those 25 hundred, that's -- the patterns start to jump out at 0036 1 you. And if it is as mundane as when to make the 2 transition from QuickBooks or can be high value-added 3 strategic decisions, the pattern recognition leads to 4 anticipation and then application of best practices, 5 and that can be really valuable. 6 MR. CANTARELLA: Harry, this one is for you. 7 Given what you've seen -- let me put it in perspective 8 here, this question. As an entrepreneur -- now, you 9 know, the entrepreneur is thinking, "I'm going into 10 this first board meeting. I've got my new investor. 11 I've got to be a bit nervous." You know that they're 12 nervous, they're probably even more nervous than the 13 VC, I would suspect. And having been an entrepreneur, 14 I think their apprehension would have to be, "Gee, even 15 though we've heard it said that the VC does not want to 16 run the company, the VC has enormous influence over the 17 company now, and here's a new member." This is a true 18 marriage in many senses of the word. It's very hard to 19 get a divorce. I guess the question is, at this point, 20 Harry, with what you've seen, How best should an 21 entrepreneur walk into that first board meeting with 22 the right hat on? How should they view this 23 relationship and their expectations of themselves going 24 in? How should they view this going in? 25 MR. WELLER: So -- this was an assigned 0037 1 question, so I thought about this, and my first 2 temptation was to create this list of things not to do. 3 Then I decided that wasn't very productive, because 4 then I would sound too critical. And so probably in my 5 -- I, sort of, took a step back, and I just said, you 6 know, What if I were the entrepreneur and I wanted to 7 talk to a couple of -- a lot of our partners are 8 actually former VCs or former entrepreneurs of NEA who 9 had successes. And one thing to remember in all of 10 this, I realized when I went and talked to them is, 11 there's an entrepreneurial life cycle. You've got to 12 have a very long-term perspective. Even at your first 13 board meeting, you need to think about things in terms 14 of how long this relationship is going to be and how 15 this might not be the first relationship; it might be 16 one of a cycle of relationships, and it takes time to 17 develop, or it takes time to develop a VC relationship. 18 So, with that in your mind, I don't think you should go 19 into your first board meeting too nervous. I think -- 20 give it some time. So that's comment number one. 21 Comment number two, I think you should treat 22 a board as if it's a newborn creature that is learning 23 and evolving over time, and that you're part of the 24 central nervous system of that creature. But don't 25 expect too much too early because the reality is, that 0038 1 board needs to learn to communicate, it needs to learn 2 to make decisions, it needs to, maybe most importantly, 3 tolerate adversity as an entity, and it won't be able 4 to do that well at first. It needs to be educated over 5 time, and it won't happen at the first board meeting. 6 So, some thoughts about that. One thought is 7 that -- you hear everyone talk about why honesty, 8 integrity, transparency is so important. It's not 9 because we go to church every week, it's not because we 10 go to church every day, it's not because we're good 11 people. The reality is that being very transparent 12 reduces the friction in communication, it really 13 enables you to communicate better and more precisely. 14 Because I think every VC -- I don't know how many of 15 you have read "Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy," but 16 in "Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy" there's something 17 called a "babblefish" you insert in your ear, and it 18 allows you to translate anything anyone says from any 19 galaxy. Every VC has a "babblefish" that gets tuned 20 over time relative to how that board is communicating 21 and how that entrepreneur is communicating. The more 22 translation that has to occur, the more handicapping 23 that occurs over time, the bigger that "babblefish" is. 24 And the reality is that oftentimes a board will learn 25 to tolerate a lot of miscommunication and adjust in the 0039 1 background. 2 So my point is, on all this, I think it's 3 extremely important to be transparent up front, to 4 build and educate your board as if it's an entity, to 5 communicate well. Do not shield the board, because the 6 reality is, is then you'll build -- you won't build the 7 tolerance in that group for dealing with adversity. As 8 you would teach your child -- I mean, it's very good to 9 get your child in front of adverse situations, right? 10 Same with your board. 11 So, that's probably the main points I would 12 leave here. One other quick thing, though. Remember 13 that a board meeting is not an event. I think the 14 reality is, a board meeting is a part of a process. So 15 one tip, always season your board. And what I mean by 16 that is, call each of your board members before a board 17 meeting, tell them what you're agenda's going to be, 18 tell them what your concerns are, tell them what your 19 changes in strategies are. A board meeting is not the 20 time to introduce a new idea; it is a time to discuss 21 the new idea you introduced a week ago. So, that way 22 you basically level-set the playing field. God knows, 23 I've seen so many board meetings where the whole board 24 meeting is set -- level-setting everybody, and by the 25 time you actually get into truly discussion issues, the 0040 1 board meeting is over. 2 So there are a couple of thoughts. I would 3 leave it to you guys to, sort of, fill in the rest. 4 MR. FREDRICK: I like the notion that a board 5 is like children, which I think -- tongue in cheek, a 6 little bit -- but I think there's a lot of truth to the 7 fact that you've got to "grow" a board. You've got to 8 grow them, as Harry said, to understand your business, 9 to understand each other, to become an effective 10 working unit that they're not going to be on day one. 11 MR. CANTARELLA: Well, we've had a few 12 assigned questions. We'll have a few more. 13 A candid question here. There must be some 14 good stories from that first board meeting, something 15 you guys went into, I want to hear about if you can 16 keep it anonymous. Is there anything that happened 17 where you maybe had some overanxious expectations or 18 who knows what? Nervousness? 19 MR. WELLER: I've got one, but it's not me; 20 it's Peter Bayer's biggest deal. This one's really 21 actually unbelievable. So Peter Bayer's -- and I'll 22 tell you who it was; it was UUNet -- and he invested, 23 along with Xcel, a million dollars. And he went into 24 his first board meeting -- one of our venture partners, 25 Mike O'Dell, he's now a venture partner; he was one of 0041 1 the founders of UUNet -- he went into the -- Peter goes 2 into the board meeting, they go through their strategy 3 and report on their success. They had good sales, but 4 then, all of a sudden, the founder turned around and 5 said, "But I've got one problem. I'm out of cash." 6 The first board meeting. 7 [Laughter.] 8 MR. WELLER: They had not properly accounted 9 for, because they didn't have a CFO, all of the 10 accounts payable. And bum on NEA for not doing the due 11 diligence to identify it. So they didn't have a CIO. 12 But then they identify it. But they didn't have a CFO. 13 So when they hired the CFO they found this. And 14 literally Peter had to go from that meeting back to the 15 partnership and said, "Oh, we need another million 16 dollars." So you can imagine -- 17 MR. FREDERICK: The punch line is -- tell 18 them how much money you made on that. 19 [Laughter.] 20 MR. WELLER: So the punch line is, again, 21 initial conditions, look at board meetings, in the end, 22 as an evolving process; don't do a surprise like that. 23 That almost destroyed the deal. 24 MR. FREDERICK: The lesson there is not to 25 run out of cash. 0042 1 MR. WELLER: But what I do think is 2 interesting is -- looking back on it, is, in the end it 3 was, sort of, an endearing experience, but that was 4 Peter's first -- one of his first deals, and he nearly 5 -- it nearly killed the deal by there being that big a 6 surprise, and it would have been a shame, because it 7 was one of the biggest-returning deals in our firm, and 8 it almost died right there. 9 So I would very much advise no surprises. 10 That is an accent on that one. 11 MR. CANTARELLA: That's a great story. 12 MR. FRANTZ: Can I take 30 seconds to say -- 13 in terms of the entrepreneur's expectations, ought to 14 be the partners sitting at your table at the board 15 meeting as an ally. You didn't just cut the deal. Now 16 they're something of an adversary at the table that the 17 owner is -- my firm is now different. You've got 18 somebody who if -- to Harry's point, you surprise them 19 -- and I'm sure Peter did not enjoy going back to the 20 partnership and explaining what had happened. None of 21 us feel like that. We all are very big advocates to do 22 the deal -- that is why we're on your board -- and so 23 you should expect, one, by that open communication, 24 that transparency, you're helping prevent them from 25 having a very rough Monday when they go back to the 0043 1 partnership. But, more important, they're expecting to 2 help you. So you should go into that first board 3 meeting with, "How can I leverage Scott, Harry, and 4 Steve as best as possible? I don't want to overwhelm 5 them the first time. I've to bring them along a little 6 bit, but I want to get some things moving here." Your 7 expectation ought to be that they are to help you. 8 MR. CANTARELLA: And I think maybe the lesson 9 learned -- that's a really great story, Harry. Thanks 10 for sharing that. It's kind of funny to us, but think 11 about it if it happened to you. 12 Clearly -- but think about it, if it happened 13 to you -- clearly, you can hear that you have to 14 communicate right up front -- if it happened to you, 15 can you imagine what would have happened? As good as 16 the deal turned out in this case, could you imagine 17 what would have happened if they had tried to hide 18 that? Would the deal have turned out the same? Just a 19 thought. 20 Steve, I'm going to throw you this next ball. 21 You know, there's analogies that we hear often about 22 the VC and entrepreneur getting into bed together, and, 23 not to get too risque here, but, as we were talking 24 about this dating/marriage thing, I think that is a 25 very poor analogy, because, in reality, again, talking 0044 1 about a relationship, we're talking about the fact that 2 you're not in bed together, you're in a marriage 3 together. 4 Now, with that being the case, those of us 5 who have recently been married, or who have been 6 married awhile, know that there are certain buckets and 7 processes that you have to think through, especially 8 early on in the relationship. For me, it was how I 9 turn the toothpaste tube and a few other things I did 10 around the house, and how did I deal with the list of 11 things to get done. Now we're outside the board 12 meeting. Now we've gone and started to execute. 13 Steve, when you think about it, in this first 14 -- the first early days of execution, what are the top 15 issues that need to be addressed by both parties -- top 16 processes, top buckets that should be addressed? And I 17 guess the other side question to that is, What's the 18 best way for each party to best communicate their 19 concerns or issues with those things? Because I've 20 found, in a marriage, if you're not communicating about 21 those key areas, you end up with some conflict. So how 22 does that translate to this environment? 23 MR. FREDRICK: So it's interesting that the 24 bulk of these questions all get back to this constant 25 of communication. And, in many ways, just like a 0045 1 marriage, you get married, you have a little bit of a 2 honeymoon period, and then you realize you don't know 3 everything about your spouse that you thought you knew. 4 Maybe it's the toothpaste; maybe, in my case, it's the 5 toilet seat, whatever it might be. But there's an 6 ongoing relationship that has to be built that's 7 focused on communication. And also, in this instance, 8 I think, especially for the investor and entrepreneur, 9 it's the building of trust. You both need to be 10 working to build that trust factor to where it is rock 11 solid. And if there are any lingering suspicions 12 about, What does this person really want? What is this 13 person's agenda? -- I mean, hopefully that's all far 14 been put to bed before the investment is made. But 15 that trust factor, to me, is what makes the deal work. 16 If that is not there, then you never know whether 17 you're getting the straight scoop. 18 And this can work both ways. I mean, there 19 are venture investors that perhaps don't communicate as 20 effectively as they should, right? So it is a two-way 21 street to make that work. 22 I think, in terms of how you go about it, I 23 mean, you've got to sit down and talk 'em through. And 24 in the early days, if it's an early-stage investment, 25 we do quite a number of very early deals where it's 0046 1 maybe us and another co-investor, and the company is 2 being started as we make this investment. And so, as 3 Scott mentioned earlier, there's daily communication 4 either by phone or by e-mail, there are breakfasts 5 outside of board meetings and lots of ongoing dialogue. 6 I think it is also constructive for the 7 investors to say, "Hey, here is how we would like 8 information to be shared with us." For instance, in a 9 board meeting, "Here's a sample board packet. Here's 10 how we would like the financials to look." Or, "Here's 11 some examples. We're not going to tell you exactly how 12 to do it, but here's some thoughts." 13 Now, again, the level of guidance there is 14 going to depend quite a bit on the level of experience 15 of the management team. That team has done this a 16 hundred times before. Shame on me to try to tell them 17 how to do it. I'm investing in people that are 18 accomplished. But there are going to be teams and 19 times where folks haven't ever taken venture money 20 before, they don't know what we want or how we like to 21 see things. And I know all of us have examples of 22 that. In fact, some firms have even compiled books, 23 and, kind of, best practices, here are great ways to 24 put in place a hiring plan and a pro-forma financials 25 and -- et cetera. 0047 1 The last thing I guess I would add is, I 2 think it's also very constructive to sit down and talk 3 about, What are the goals for the business over the 4 next quarter, or the next year, or prior to some 5 meaningful milestone? Let's get those out on the 6 table. I mean, oftentimes it's things like rounding 7 out the management team, the hiring plan, rounding out 8 the board composition with outside board members, 9 securing X-million of new revenue, or launching a new 10 product or getting that customer validation. And I 11 think a good venture investor is going to be focused on 12 a couple of high-level issues and not down in the 13 minutia. They are there as a resource for any question 14 that a company might have, but I think a good investor 15 is going to be focused at the high level, saying, 16 "Hey," in a supportive way, "let me know what I can do 17 to help us get these three things accomplished." 18 MR. CANTARELLA: That's a great answer. 19 Any other thoughts on that? 20 MR. FREDERICK: If I were to stress just one 21 thing, it would be to make sure -- I mean, there's so 22 much focus and attention on the board meeting, but the 23 communication needs to go so much deeper, and it's 24 everything from calls late at night to breakfast 25 together. But one thing, unfortunately, we find is, a 0048 1 lot of board meetings get consumed by corporate 2 housekeeping, and you run out of time and you don't 3 have time to do the really deep kind of, "What's next? 4 What's around the corner? What's the big strategic 5 questions you're facing?" 6 So make sure you schedule time with your 7 board members to have those breakfasts, have the heart- 8 to-heart. We have our CEOs send us weekly reports. We 9 talk, I guess, about -- I mean, depending upon the 10 relationship, but most probably average every other 11 day. I mean, the communication has to be really, 12 really tight. If it's boardroom only, you're asking 13 for trouble. 14 MR. WELLER: Let me have some fun with this, 15 just for the fun of it. The reality is, I think, 16 though -- one of the things that's really funny to me 17 is, we're all up here, "You've got to communicate, 18 you've got to be transparent." And you do. There is a 19 "but," though; and the "but" is, it's got to be 20 relevant. And why that is so important is, a lot of 21 CEOs will say to me, "But, Harry, do you really want to 22 know everything?" And the answer is, no, I don't. 23 There is a demilitarized zone in which you can play 24 with a little bit, because you've got to keep it to the 25 big issues, the relevant issues. We leave it to you to 0049 1 have that decision-making power, and we will build 2 trust in your ability to make those decisions over 3 time, and you will build trust in our ability to focus 4 on the right things at the board meetings and in the 5 calls and in the relationships. But make sure you've 6 got a test of relevancy. 7 Now, don't use that -- I mean, what happens - 8 - what happens over and over again is, very well- 9 intended entrepreneurs say, "I've got a little bit of 10 evidence of what could be a big problem. I'm not going 11 to say anything." But then they become subject to 12 their history of reporting, and the problem becomes 13 bigger. But because they didn't report it before, it 14 continues. 15 And so my point is, is that this is an art, 16 not a science, and the art here is, you need to 17 establish early what is relevant and what is not, and 18 so do we, on our side. But there's a lot of judgement 19 there, and that's, I think, where you hit Steve's point 20 about trust being so incredibly important. And that is 21 something that is learned over time; it doesn't happen 22 immediately. 23 MR. CANTARELLA: So what I'm hearing is that 24 if you set the proper expectations up front, if you 25 maybe set goals, Steve, as you mentioned, and you maybe 0050 1 even -- it's probably a sign of power that if an 2 entrepreneur asks you, "Do you have best practices of 3 how we should we go about this long-term so we can 4 separate from the chaff and the noise from what we 5 really need to focus on in the board meetings and the 6 communications and the calls?" It's probably a good 7 thing if the entrepreneur does that earlier rather than 8 later, right? 9 MR. FREDERICK: Absolutely. You need to use 10 common sense, and it's going to depend on who the board 11 member is. To give you an example from our shop, one 12 of the things we do is, we double-team every deal, and 13 we do that intentionally. And I do a lot of deals with 14 Art Marks. The level of accessibility between Art and 15 I is very different, and it's that way by design. And 16 so I think our CEOs use me with a lot more of the -- 17 they're trying to figure out how to separate the wheat 18 from the chaff, and then I help them do that. And then 19 once that's done, we get Art more involved. So use 20 common sense. 21 MR. FREDRICK: And, Chris, let me also add 22 one thing that I think is important here. Tensions are 23 going to occur. There are going to be disagreements or 24 miscommunications. And, I think, just like in a 25 marriage, both parties want to defuse those quickly. 0051 1 In a marriage, the adage is, "Don't go to bed mad at 2 each other," or, as my mother-in-law told me, if you're 3 going to fight, always fight naked. 4 [Laughter.] 5 MR. CANTARELLA: Okay. 6 [Laughter.] 7 MR. FREDRICK: Maybe that was too much 8 information. 9 [Laughter.] 10 MR. FREDRICK: But the point I'm trying to 11 drive home is that you need to defuse tensions when 12 they occur, because they will occur, but you need to be 13 proactive and get those behind you. 14 MR. FRANTZ: I'm not going to another board 15 meeting with you. 16 [Laughter.] 17 MR. FRANTZ: He is spot-on. And just to 18 extend off that, you grow in that relationship. 19 Sometimes when you butt heads like that, you will learn 20 that much more about one another and how you can take 21 that relationship to a new level by working together to 22 solve the problem. So I think he is spot-on. 23 MR. CANTARELLA: In all fairness, I've heard 24 that before. That is a good one, though. I think the 25 key is to -- that transparency that Harry and Steve so 0052 1 eloquently talked about. 2 Scott, this one's to you. Now, we've heard 3 this time and again, what value -- right? -- the VC 4 brings. Now I think the way we usually hear this, it 5 comes in the form of, "Well, we can help you 6 financially, we can help you do these other things." 7 But earlier today we were just talking about pattern 8 recognition. You rarely hear about that. Maybe you 9 could expound on the top three ways that you think it's 10 really happening, the value is really being provided. 11 It seems like pattern recognition would be a great one. 12 MR. FREDERICK: Absolutely. And I'm glad you 13 said "top three," because that's all I had. 14 [Laughter.] 15 MR. FREDERICK: I put, kind of, venture- 16 capital value-added in three main buckets. It's 17 connections and introductions, and the value there is 18 pretty self-explanatory, and almost any VC should be 19 able to bring that to the table. Of course, the scope 20 and the depth of the rolodexes will be different, but 21 connections and introductions is, kind of, self- 22 evident. 23 The second is what I call industry-specific 24 knowledge or, kind of, help with strategic vision. 25 And, again, that is relatively self-explanatory, and 0053 1 it's going to vary by -- that's really going to vary by 2 venture investor and it's going to vary by sector. I 3 mean, there are some investors who are very deep in 4 particular verticals, and they're not going to be deep 5 in others. 6 The third big bucket of value-add, though, 7 is, I think, the one that is often least appreciated on 8 the front end, but ultimately turns out to be most 9 appreciated, and that's help with what I call, kind of, 10 the five key company-building processes. Any company 11 that succeeds has got to do product development, 12 customer acquisition, customer deployment, and then 13 finance and administration challenges, and learn how to 14 build a team. And it's that kind of pattern 15 recognition across those five company-building 16 processes where, I think, really starts separating the 17 value-add of some VCs. And you're not going to find 18 all three buckets, you're not going to find a VC who 19 has all three buckets. So think through what is it you 20 really need, and then try to recruit a board member 21 accordingly. It's like when you select a basketball 22 team, you wouldn't have five centers or five point 23 guards. Boards are the exact same way. Think about 24 where your holes are, and try to plug the holes. 25 MR. CANTARELLA: As a side question, Scott, 0054 1 do you have any examples where the entrepreneur went in 2 really expecting too much right up front from the VC, 3 started asking for introductions the first day, and you 4 really need to get through the basics first? 5 MR. FREDERICK: It's a good question. We try 6 to flush that out in the diligence process. And one of 7 the things that started as an internal process at 8 Valhalla which has now really manifested itself and, I 9 think, really helps us in due diligence and helps get 10 our relationship with an entrepreneur off on the right 11 path is, we have a hundred-day plan. We sit down with 12 the entrepreneur once we have decided to make an 13 investment. We try to get away from that being on 14 opposite sides of the table negotiating a deal, and 15 sweating the terms, and we try to sit down, and we will 16 go have dinner together and drink wine, but we will map 17 out a hundred-day plan, "These are the things that we 18 think are highest priority. What are the things you 19 think are the highest priority?" And we're going to 20 put names and dates, and we're going to make specific 21 assignments to, not only the company, obviously, but 22 also to us and our entire team. And so that process 23 helps, kind of, weed out the entrepreneur who has 24 unrealistic expectations. But that process will flush 25 it out. 0055 1 We've had entrepreneurs who will just think 2 -- sure, we have a relationship with, say, Cisco, but 3 that does not mean that we can get Cisco to buy you for 4 $250 million on day one. There are entrepreneurs who 5 will ask for those meetings, those kind of instant 6 introductions, and something like that is probably 7 inappropriate. 8 MR. CANTARELLA: That's great. 9 Well, Mark, I'll throw this one to you. We 10 hear a lot about being a good corporate leader, for the 11 CEO to be a good leader. As we know, I think many of 12 us realize, and I think it is well established, that 13 leaders are not born; they're made. What does it mean, 14 first of all, in your interpretation, for a CEO, and 15 even the other CXOs on the team, to be good leaders? 16 And what can they do? Maybe even some specific 17 examples you've seen where somebody has worked on 18 themselves and become a better leader over time, what 19 have they done to do that? 20 MR. FRANTZ: In my opinion, it is -- you 21 provide that leadership by making that level of 22 commitment that one would expect with that position of 23 responsibility, taking that responsibility and 24 projecting it through the actions you carry all day 25 long, interacting with your team. Oftentimes, in 0056 1 companies like these, you have people in roles they've 2 never been in before. They've stepped up into a role 3 from their last firm, so the controller of X-firm is 4 now the CFO of this firm, the VP of product development 5 is the CPO here, the VP of sales is now the CPO. And 6 so they've got to learn in that role and in themselves, 7 but they need to go into it understanding what it is 8 that role entails and try and commit to that, both to 9 the people above them, whether it be the VP of sales to 10 the CEO, or the CEO to the board, and the people below 11 them, because a lot of times they're first-time people. 12 So it is conducting yourself in the 13 appropriate manner commensurate with the title one has. 14 Sometimes you don't know what that is. 15 So the best entrepreneurs that I've seen do a 16 couple of different thing. One, they take advantage of 17 their network amongst their peers and ask an awful lot 18 of questions, "Hey, I'm going to be interviewed for 19 this VP of sales slot at this company that NEA just 20 backed. What is it they expect at NEA on the 21 enterprise software selling cycle, et cetera? Once you 22 get the job, they call up the other VP-of-sales guys at 23 the firm, they engage themselves in community 24 activities, like Mindshare. I think that's been a 25 great thing for this region. I know one of our CEOs 0057 1 just finished it. I was looking at the alumni list, 2 and it was, like, wow, this is pretty amazing. So they 3 will take that effort internally, externally, and then 4 externally into the community to take advantage of the 5 resources that are there, and are constantly working to 6 educate themselves. 7 The other thing is the adage of the really 8 best and brightest. Our capable leaders are those who 9 go out and hire people who are brighter than them and 10 then empower them to be able to do their job. And I 11 think that rings a hundred percent true, in my personal 12 opinion. Every one of our CEOs who I've seen grow, 13 initially has not been afraid to hire somebody on their 14 team, either at their side, above them, and then, as a 15 sub-segment of that, would be outside directors going 16 and getting former CEOs, former founders, former CFOs, 17 whatever the case may be, by the sector, and asking 18 them to participate. So hire the best and brightest to 19 work with you, even if it means hiring your new boss, 20 and not being afraid to go out and tap in. I've had 21 the pleasure of working with some great independent 22 directors, and I am the biggest, biggest fan of them, 23 because I think the value they add at the table is not 24 just keeping the investors honest, which a good one 25 will do, but is also there for the CEO to be like, 0058 1 "Man, I just -- I need a shoulder to lean on. You've 2 been here before." And that perspective is so much 3 different. 4 I would point out one thing. As I can see 5 here in the audience, I have a perfect example. At 6 Blackboard, Michael and Matt have grown this company 7 into now a half-a-billion-dollar market-cap company, 8 but along the way they've not been afraid to ask people 9 of great seasoning to join the team to get them through 10 opportunities. Sometimes it hasn't worked out. We've 11 had two CEOs, or one CEO and one COO, in the past who 12 were very valuable to the company, but as the company 13 grew, it didn't work out. We've also had people like 14 Mary McPherson, who we wouldn't have gotten through 15 this recent IPO had she not joined the team and helped 16 these guys and get them ready for the public markets 17 and the like. And Pete Rapetti, who's the CFO. So 18 these two young men have done a phenomenal job of 19 growing this great big company. But, in doing it, they 20 have brought on people who are older, wiser, and more 21 experienced than them to help them make a greater 22 enterprise. 23 MR. CANTARELLA: Has there every been 24 anything that -- I mean, there's certain things that 25 tip you off or make the hairs stand up on the back of 0059 1 your neck about a particular entrepreneur or leader? 2 What are the types of things? Just as an aside to this 3 question, more on the candid side, that you've seen 4 that have given you some kind of a warning sign, you 5 say, "Oh, geez, I've got a little bit of a worry now 6 about this leader." Is there anything you could 7 mention? -- anonymously, of course. 8 MR. FRANTZ: I would say, candidly, taking a 9 page out of Steve's pattern recognition, every now and 10 then -- anybody in this room can go look at my bio; I 11 didn't run Cisco, I didn't run Microsoft, I didn't run 12 Intel at any point, so my operating experience isn't 13 the depth of some other members of this panel, as well 14 as some of the partners in my own firm. And every now 15 and then I'll get one of my CEOs giving me the, "Hey, 16 you don't know what it's like to run this company." 17 And, well, actually, "No, you're right, I actually 18 don't. But, however, I sit on six other boards, whose 19 combined revenue is close to $200 million." And so I 20 would like to think that, between me and the other 21 members of the board, who probably do have operating 22 experience, we do at least have some perspective. But 23 when you get that perspective very early on, like, you 24 know, "I really don't want to hear your advice and 25 counsel because you can't relate," I, kind of, start 0060 1 going, "Gee, maybe you picked the wrong person to sit 2 on your board." I mean, when they're that offensive 3 about it -- not offensive. One could take it 4 offensively; I don't. But I mean offensively, like 5 trying to define their space. 6 MR. CANTARELLA: "You don't know what it's 7 like," if they said that. 8 Well, we talked a little bit about chemistry 9 earlier on. There has to be some kind of chemistry for 10 the transaction to be taking place. But I would 11 imagine that -- and, Harry, this -- I'm going to shoot 12 this one to you. There's some responsibility in the 13 entrepreneur to ensure that chemistry is optimal over 14 time and that it gets better and that it grows. Are 15 there any ideas you have as to -- or anything you've 16 seen, where an entrepreneur has been able to improve 17 chemistry over time? Anything outside the boardroom, 18 keeping in touch, doing something to ensure that the 19 chemistry is there between the entrepreneur and the VC? 20 MR. WELLER: Let's see, I guess -- I want to 21 answer this question differently than I had planned -- 22 I guess, to me, it's often good to just lay out what 23 the tensions are in a board in between a VC and 24 entrepreneurial relationship. Ultimately, we haven't 25 really discussed it, but there's an obvious tension 0061 1 that is always there -- control, ownership. And the 2 reality is, is a VC wants to own as much as we can, and 3 we want to have almost as much control as we can 4 without having to run the business. And an 5 entrepreneur wants as much control as they can get, as 6 much ownership as they can get. And it seems like 7 these are often directly in opposition, and they are. 8 And the reality is, probably the best entrepreneurs 9 I've worked with are able to discuss that tension, 10 because it is the most -- it is one of the biggest 11 tensions that is just inherent in the way the 12 relationship is built. And, frankly, it's also a very 13 useful tension, it needs to be there in order to make 14 sure management stays incented and the board stays 15 incented, and everyone can get the general returns. 16 But I think where it sometimes gets off 17 kilter is when you do something, like try to build a 18 team. That can come across as taking control. For 19 example, let's say we've decided, as a board, and the 20 entrepreneur doesn't agree, that we do need to get a 21 new CEO. Is that really a control issue, or trying to 22 mitigate risk because we see, through some pattern 23 recognition, that the CEO really doesn't understand how 24 to take a better grasp of the market that seems to be 25 emerging? It goes without saying this is some 0062 1 entrepreneurs' worst nightmare. And, frankly, from a 2 board's perspective, it actually is our worst 3 nightmare, as well. It's not fun to go through this 4 process. And I think you have to throw it out there, 5 because I think it actually is sitting in the back of 6 everyone's minds. Generally speaking, in a board 7 meeting, if you don't -- particularly if you don't have 8 an experienced CEO or experienced entrepreneur -- and 9 this is where I get back to number one, make sure 10 you've got all the issues on the table. If you are 11 fearful of that, discuss that with your board and 12 discuss how we can help you grow as a CEO if that is a 13 role you want to keep. But, more importantly, the 14 thing that really works out well is when you engage 15 your VCs and your board as mentors, to the question 16 that Mark got. 17 The reality is, is that if you engage your 18 board as a set of mentors -- I mean, in NEA, half our 19 -- as I said, half our partners are former 20 entrepreneurs -- you'll understand that the 21 entrepreneurial life cycle is one that goes on, as I 22 mentioned earlier, over and over and over and over 23 again. And it is not just this position, it is not 24 just this company, and it's not just this role. The 25 idea is to enhance you as an entrepreneur over time. 0063 1 And if you've got concerns about control, or if you 2 have concerns about ownership, or if you have concerns 3 about how the team is going to be built, you really 4 should lay them out on the table really, really early 5 so the board can discuss that so there are no surprises 6 from the board coming to you, saying, "Hey, you're 7 going to get either replaced or we're going to bring 8 someone in over you." I think that is -- that tension 9 around control is one of the bigger tensions you have 10 to address over time, because it is very rarely said, 11 people don't like to talk about it, and yet it's a 12 healthy tension at the same time. I mean, you need to 13 have it in order to have things properly allocated as a 14 company. 15 So I guess the net of it -- sorry for 16 changing my answer in midstream, but I guess the net of 17 what I'm saying is, bring those things forward, make 18 sure you discuss your development as an entrepreneur 19 over time with your board members so they can tell you 20 where they think you really are in the cycle and where 21 you're going to be. What I saw in Kutu that fascinated 22 me is they have such a long-term perspective, he was 23 not CEO of Silicon Graphics; he was one of the early 24 founders of the company, but he was not CEO. He let 25 himself get replaced. He learned from Jim Clark. He 0064 1 learned from Mark Perry. He learned from Dick 2 Cranmark. He learned from Scott Sandel. He learned 3 from Jim Clark, who's on the board, and others. He got 4 bought by Netscreen and then bought by Juniper, very 5 quick transactions. He is now next in line for CEO of 6 Juniper, and -- if we can't hire him ourselves, which 7 we're desperately trying to do -- 8 My point is, is that these are long-term 9 relationships, very long term, and you've got to look 10 beyond the current control, the current ownership, the 11 current life cycle. You've got to look very far 12 beyond. Because I think in the end, that's what will 13 really make things great for everyone involved, because 14 I think the VCs generally want to keep it a very strong 15 relationship with very creative entrepreneurs and 16 develop them into leaders, but it takes time. 17 MR. CANTARELLA: That's a great answer. 18 MR. FREDERICK: If I could just add one 19 thing. Chris brought up reality television and "The 20 Apprentice," and I can't not comment on it, because the 21 show drives me crazy. But if there's one lesson on how 22 not to do the chemistry, I think it is that show. 23 Duplicity and voting blocks make great television; it 24 makes for horrible corporate governance. So just don't 25 use those guys as role models. It does make good 0065 1 television. 2 MR. CANTARELLA: A lot of drama, that's for 3 sure. But some you don't want in the boardroom. 4 Steve, when we're talking about a marriage -- 5 you keep hitting on this, but I still think it is 6 worthwhile to keep this in mind -- you're working on a 7 constant goal. In marriage, it's long-term 8 relationship, hopefully. This is where it diverges. 9 In this kind of a relationship between the entrepreneur 10 and the VC, there can be times -- there will be, 11 potentially, times where there are subsequent 12 differences of opinions as time goes on about what the 13 end game is, what the exit is probably going to be, 14 where to drive the company to achieve a multiple for 15 the exit that is expected. Or there might be some 16 difference of opinion. How best does an entrepreneur 17 deal with this very difficult issue in navigating, 18 especially if there's a disagreement between the VC and 19 the entrepreneur about the end game? 20 MR. FREDRICK: So I have two different 21 answers for this question. And I guess the first is 22 that in my experience, I typically haven't seen the 23 entrepreneurs or the management team and the investors 24 disagree on the goal of liquidity. That may happen. 25 Others may have experience with that, but I haven't 0066 1 seen that. I have most often seen different investors 2 who sit on the same board disagree over the right 3 course to liquidity, with management aligned with one 4 group of investors, but with another group posing a 5 problem. This gets back to Harry's point of 6 structuring boards so that they're functional and that 7 the investors work well together. 8 And if I could just add one thing to the 9 notion of, when you raise money, do your due diligence. 10 I mean, ideally you're going to work with groups that 11 have worked together before, you want to work with 12 investors that have relationships with each other and 13 know each other, because that does a lot to mitigate 14 this risk down the road. But I've seen situations 15 where the obvious exit scenario presents itself, but 16 there is an investor that has a very beat up portfolio 17 elsewhere, has been counting on this one particular 18 portfolio company to bail out an otherwise devastated 19 portfolio of investments, and they have got to make 25X 20 on this return, and they are motivated, as an 21 individual and as a firm, to go quadruple or nothing, 22 because anything less and they're out of business as a 23 firm. So to sell the company for 2X or 3X or 5X, 24 whatever the number is, isn't rational. I mean, it is 25 rational; but, for them, it presents a problem. So in 0067 1 those situations, I think, what entrepreneurs have to 2 do, and management teams have to do is, they have to 3 work through their investors. 4 And we had an experience like this at 5 Blackboard. Not that experience, but a different 6 experience, where you have a problematic investor, and 7 you've got to work through your other investors to 8 apply some peer pressure to work outside of the 9 boardroom to -- anything short of strong-arming people 10 toward the consensus agenda. At the end of the day, 11 whoever has the votes can carry the day. But that is 12 not typically the way you like to have to resort to 13 things. 14 But I think the bigger risk is that all your 15 investors aren't aligned, versus management, versus 16 investors. 17 We did have one experience where we had a 18 company, Telegy Networks, that had two suitors -- one 19 suitor was willing to pay 800 million; the other suitor 20 offered a billion-two. The management team said, "We 21 cannot work for the CEO of the company that offered a 22 billion-two. We would prefer to sell to TI, who 23 offered 800 million." And the board said, "Okay, it's 24 your call," gave up 400 million bucks. But, at the end 25 of the day, the management team has to see this through 0068 1 to make it successful, and you're buying stock or 2 you're being paid in stock, and there's some upside 3 that comes from that down the road. 4 So those are two very different answers, but 5 keep conscious of the board dynamic between investors. 6 MR. CANTARELLA: That's extremely insightful, 7 thanks, Steve, because I don't think a lot of the 8 entrepreneurs think through that fully and realize why 9 syndicate partners tend to like to work with each other 10 on a more regular basis than not, and how that works. 11 MR. FREDERICK: And if I could just add one 12 thing, because there's a good -- I know people have 13 heard the "Martini Rule of Venture Capital." Venture 14 capitalists are a lot like martinis -- one's good, 15 two's better, three can be too many, and four is 16 generally an absolute disaster. 17 [Laughter.] 18 MR. CANTARELLA: Well, we're catching up on 19 time here -- I mean, we're not catching up; we're 20 getting behind on time here. We planned for the panel 21 to be around for a couple of minutes here. We've got 22 -- 10:00 o'clock, I think, we're scheduled to. I have 23 two more questions. Maybe I will ask the one here to 24 you, Scott, and I had a wrap-up question, and I'll, 25 kind of, keep that -- ask for you to keep that short. 0069 1 Scott, we talked about some negatives that 2 happen -- tensions, negative things that happen in a 3 marriage, negative things that happen in a relationship 4 between the VC and the entrepreneur, communicating 5 that, building trust and confidence. I guess this is 6 going to hit on some of the things we've already talked 7 about, but to ask the question again because it's so 8 critical, How should an entrepreneur view difficult 9 kinds of communication like this? How should they 10 approach bad news? 11 MR. FREDERICK: I shouldn't say it's easy, 12 but I think the roles are easy. The sooner you can 13 tell bad news, the better. Be straightforward. You 14 don't need excess drama. Focus on problem-solving, not 15 excuses. If there's a golden rule, I think -- being 16 close to D.C., I think we can learn from politicians -- 17 don't try to cover up. The cover-up is always worse. 18 Just be straightforward, get it out in the open. 19 And one of the things I always try to tell 20 myself during, kind of, bad-news situations, I think it 21 can be helpful for an entrepreneur. We can't always 22 control the circumstances we find ourselves in, but you 23 can control how you respond to them. So bad-news 24 situations can be a time for an executive to shine. 25 Step up, deliver the news early, crisply, focus on 0070 1 problem-solving. 2 MR. CANTARELLA: You know, I really 3 appreciate that, Scott. That is a key. And if you 4 think about it, I think it was summed up in the way 5 Harry told that story about, "Well, hello, good 6 morning, I'm out of cash." If you have to do it, you 7 have to do it. You don't get there -- you know, you do 8 everything you can not to get in that position. 9 I think because we're so short on time and 10 because Jeff Bede is going to wrap up here for us with 11 some commonalities, I had one last question that had to 12 do with this commonality theme through this thing, but 13 I think we've hit on so many of them. 14 Jeff Bede, from Chessiecap, is going to give 15 us a summary. 16 First of all, I would like to thank our 17 panel. 18 [Applause.] 19 MR. CANTARELLA: Let me just make one 20 comment. It's always a pleasure to work with these 21 guys. I know there's a sold camaraderie among them, 22 and it's not easy to be a VC and be this candid. It 23 doesn't come naturally for a lot of folks in the 24 community. I think that it is very difficult, and it 25 is a very difficult job they do. And I think a lot of 0071 1 people need to realize that, and I really appreciate 2 you guys spending time with us today. 3 MR. BEDE: I want to echo what Chris said. 4 Any good seminar, the enthusiasm and the openness of 5 the panel is absolutely critical, and these guys were 6 great today. So I'm just going to quickly wrap up what 7 we talked about today. 8 The purpose of these three seminars, as we 9 talked about before, was really to get a tangible and 10 inside look at the venture-capital process. And what 11 we've tried to do is go a few levels deeper than the 12 typical seminar and really get more honest and open, 13 which these guys, thankfully, did. 14 Today's session was on living with your VC 15 and how to maximize that relationship with your 16 investors. It's something that really isn't a focus of 17 these type of sessions, and I think we've talked about 18 it today. It is extremely important. VCs can add a 19 lot of value to your company. They are partners. They 20 should be treated as such. And I've seen it on several 21 occasions where companies -- the relationship turns 22 sour, and it can be extremely poisonous to a company. 23 And so, as an entrepreneur, you should do everything 24 you can to manage that relationship. 25 So a few thoughts we've talked about already 0072 1 -- I'll not go into too much depth -- but 2 communication. I know it is obvious, but people -- 3 especially as time goes on, the VCs are busy, you guys 4 are busy, but make sure that you keep that flow of 5 communication going. It has a lot of positive benefits 6 that open dialogue, it helps avoid surprises so 7 everyone's on the same page. And there's nothing that 8 investors hate more than being surprised. I think all 9 of these guys mentioned that. 10 The second thing is, keeping that 11 communication going builds chemistry. It -- both 12 inside the boardroom, but also outside the boardroom. 13 The more you're having that regular dialogue, the 14 better the chemistry, so that when the hard decisions 15 come, you're better equipped to make those decisions. 16 The second point is milestones. My opinion. 17 Set objective, realistic milestones and goals. We 18 talked about it today. It gets everyone on the same 19 page. It brings a buy-in from your investors and from 20 the team, and really builds that transparency these 21 guys talked about, where everyone knows what they're 22 going to do; then you execute on that plan and you're 23 able to identify problems sooner than you otherwise 24 would. 25 A few more thoughts. Manage the 0073 1 relationship, as Harry mentioned. Make it more of a 2 war-room, not a theater where they're just kind of 3 watching you act up there. Really manage that 4 chemistry, manage the relationship, and manage your 5 board. And if all else fails, get naked. 6 [Laughter.] 7 MR. BEDE: And then the last point is, be 8 demanding of these guys. They have a lot of 9 experience, they are busy, and sometimes have other 10 focuses. Make sure that you -- you know, we talked 11 about the ways that VCs can add value. Well, make sure 12 you take them up on it. Make sure that you get that 13 commitment and buy-in from them. It can be extremely 14 helpful for your company. 15 So, with that, I would like to thank the 16 panel again, thank our sponsors, and thank you for 17 attending. Everyone's going to be around for 30 more 18 minutes afterwards, so please stick around and ask 19 questions. 20 Thank you. 21 [Applause.] 22 [Whereupon, at 9:45 a.m., the meeting was 23 adjourned.] 24 25